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Lord Dyson and the Implied Sanctions Doctrine 
Professor Stuart Sime, City University London 
 
Effective case management by the courts is seen to be essential in combating the dual problems of 
delay and expense in the conduct of litigation. Setting realistic timetables for the progress of cases 
through to trial, and expending no more than a proportionate amount of time and energy on the 
interlocutory stages of civil procedure, are part of the equation. A culture of compliance, combined 
with meaningful sanctions in the event of default, are key components of the system. Addressing 
deficiencies in these two last areas formed central parts of the civil justice reforms of 19981 and 
20132. The success of these reforms in tackling delay has resulted in the framework of the Civil 
Procedure Rules being adopted in other jurisdictions3. A continuing problem both here and abroad is 
how best to deal with instances of non-compliance. 
 
Express sanctions may be laid down in the rules, practice directions, or in court orders tailored to the 
circumstances of individual cases. Examples are striking out for non-payment of certain court fees4 
and being debarred from calling witnesses whose witness statements are not exchanged in 
accordance with the court's directions5. Where the court imposes a prospective sanction in the 
event of non-compliance it will do so in the form of an 'unless' order which must state the precise 
time when the deadline will elapse6. As the deadlines and consequences of breach are spelt out 
expressly, there is little excuse for parties not realising what they have to do, and what will happen if 
they fail to do so. 
 
An implied sanction is said to arise where a party needs to seek the court's permission in order to 
take a step in the proceedings out of time in circumstances where, if permission is refused, some 
adverse consequence will follow from that refusal. The archetypical examples are seeking 
permission to appeal out of time and setting aside default judgments. In these situations, failing to 
extend time or to set aside means the pre-existing judgment stands, which is said to be the implied 
sanction for failing to adhere to the relevant time limit. This is significant, because it is said to follow 
that the restrictive principles relating to seeking relief from sanctions7 must be applied, at least by 
analogy, to these applications. 
 
Implied sanctions should have no place in the civil justice system. The rule of law dictates that the 
law must be accessible, and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable8. Nevertheless, an 
implied sanctions doctrine has taken root, almost unnoticed by the commentators on civil 
procedure9, but it is said that at least in certain situations it is now too well established to be 
overturned10.  
                                                          
1 Implemented by the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) following the publication of Lord Woolf's 
Access to Justice: Final Report (July 1996); Blackstone's Guide to the Civil Procedure Rules, ed Charles Plant, 
1999 Blackstone Press, chapter 11. 
2 Implemented primarily by the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013 (SI 2013/ 262) following the 
publication of Sir Rupert Jackson's Final Report on Civil Litigation Costs (December 2009); Blackstone's Guide to 
the Civil Justice Reforms, Sime and French, 2013 Oxford, chapter 5. 
3 Of particular relevance to this article is the adoption of the Civil Procedure Rules, with local adjustments, in 
Trinidad and Tobago.  
4 CPR, r 3.7. 
5 CPR, r 32.10. This sanction applies unless the court gives permission. 
6 PD 40B, paras 8.1, 8.2. 
7 In CPR, r 3.9, together with the guidelines now to be found in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014 EWCA Cic 906, 
[2014] 1 WLR 3926. 
8 The Rule of Law, Bingham (Penguin) 2010, p 37. 
9 There is no express reference to the doctrine in Civil Practice (2014) Sweet & Maxwell (the 'White Book') or in 
the Fourth Cumulative Supplement. The only express reference to the doctrine in the literature is in 
 
Following the Civil Justice Reforms of 2013 the appellate courts in England and Wales have been 
struggling to enunciate a coherent system to deal with instances of procedural default. The main 
authorities have concentrated on how to deal with instances of breach of express sanctions imposed 
by rules, practice directions and court orders. This has proved difficult enough. The implied sanctions 
doctrine threatens to undermine the principles that have been laid down by the leading authorities 
by converting a wide range of applications into applications for relief from sanctions, at least by 
analogy. It calls into question the accepted understanding of what is meant by a 'sanction', and 
threatens to unleash an undesirable wave of satellite litigation. This article will consider the origins 
of the doctrine, the attempt by Lord Dyson to kill it off, and its subsequent re-emergence. It will 
conclude by considering how the doctrine should be codified within the general scheme of civil 
procedure. 
 
Origins of the Implied Sanctions Doctrine 
Authorities on the implied sanctions doctrine trace its origins to Sayers v Clarke Walker11. Delivering 
the main judgment, Brooke LJ said12: 
 
'In my judgment, it is equally appropriate to have regard to the check-list in CPR r 3.9 when a court is 
considering an application for an extension of time for appealing in a case of any complexity. The 
reason for this is that the applicant has not complied with CPR r 52.4(2)13, and if the court is 
unwilling to grant him relief from his failure to comply through the extension of time he is seeking, 
the consequence will be that the order of the lower court will stand and he cannot appeal it. Even 
though this may not be a sanction expressly "imposed" by the rule, the consequence will be exactly 
the same as if it had been, and it would be far better for courts to follow the check-list contained in 
CPR r 3.9 on this occasion, too, than for judges to make their own check-lists for cases where 
sanctions are implied and not expressly imposed.' 
 
In its original form, CPR, r 3.9 provided a check-list of nine factors that the court had to consider as 
part of all the circumstances of the case when deciding whether to give relief from sanctions. As 
Brooke LJ said in the quotation above, strictly r 3.9 did not apply to an application for an extension of 
time for filing an appellant's notice because r 52.4(2) does not expressly state a sanction for non-
compliance with the time limit, and r 3.9 stated that it applied "[o]n an application for relief from 
any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order ..."14. 
Particularly when read in conjunction with r 3.8(1), it is clear that r 3.9 only applies in its express 
form when a party is seeking relief from a sanction imposed by a rule, practice direction or court 
order which itself imposed the time limit that has been breached. Nevertheless, Brooke LJ said that 
the courts should apply the check-list laid down in r 3.9 where a sanction is implied, particularly on 
applications to extend time for appealing. The language used in the quotation can be taken to have a 
wider application than in relation to appeals brought out of time, and may extend to other cases 
where sanctions are implied rather than being expressly imposed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Blackstone's Civil Practice 2015 (2015) Oxford at para 48.13. The main appellate decisions are of course 
discussed in the texts on civil procedure, but usually without crystallising the doctrine in express terms. 
10 R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, per Moore-Bick LJ at [36]. 
11 Sayers v Clarke Walker [2002] EWCA Civ 645, [2002] 1 WLR 3095. 
12 Sayers [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [21]. 
13 CPR, r 52.4(2) provides (in its current form) that an appellant must file an appellant's notice at the appeal 
court within 21 days after the date of the decision of the lower court, or such other period as may be directed 
by the lower court. 
14 CPR, r 3.9(1) in its original form, current in 2002. 
Establishing a general implied sanctions doctrine was however, on reading the whole of the 
judgment, far from what the Court of Appeal intended to do in Sayers v Clarke Walker. The primary 
concern to the court in Sayers v Clarke Walker was to establish a consistent approach to applications 
to extend time for lodging an appeal. There were at least five different sets of principles or 
guidelines that could be applied on an application to appeal out of time, all of which had their 
adherents, namely: 
 
(a) applying the principles developed under the old Rules of the Supreme Court for applications for 
leave to appeal out of time. These could be summarised as needing to balance four factors: (i) the 
length of the delay; (ii) the reasons for the delay; (iii) the prospects of success on the appeal; and (iv) 
any prejudice to the respondent15; 
(b) imposing a requirement that all rules and procedures are complied with strictly16; 
(c) applying the two criteria set out in what was then PD 52, para 5.617. This provision says that on an 
application for an extension of time for filing an appellant's notice the evidence in support must 
state: (i) the reason for the delay; and (ii) the steps taken prior to the application being made. This 
was regarded in Sayers v Clarke Walker as suitable for 'very many cases', but not for the 'more 
complex cases'18; 
(d) applying the overriding objective19. This is relevant, but not sufficient in itself; 
(e) applying one of the check-lists devised by judges dealing with post-CPR applications for 
extensions of time for appealing20. For example, Lightman J had drawn up such a list in an appeal in 
the period between the introduction of the main provisions of the CPR and that of the new appellate 
structure in May 200021.  
 
The Court of Appeal in Sayers v Clarke Walker was anxious to avoid a proliferation of judge-made 
check-lists dealing with different aspects of civil procedure. In addition to Lightman J's list, 
Neuberger J had constructed a list of nine factors to be considered on applications to dismiss on 
account of delay in the unreported decision of Annodeus Entertainment Ltd v Gibson22, which 
brought together ideas from the pre-CPR case law, the overriding objective, post-CPR case law and 
the need to have a fair trial from the European Convention on Human Rights, art 6(1).  While 
accepting that Neuberger J had been fully justified in constructing that check-list in the particular 
context of the case in hand, in a later case Jonathan Parker LJ23 commented: 
 
'I do respectfully doubt the value of adopting a judicially-created checklist which does not appear in 
the rule itself. Inherent in such an approach, as it seems to me, is the danger that a body of satellite 
authority may be built up, rather as it was under the old rules in relation to the dismissal of an action 
for want of prosecution, leading in effect to the rewriting of the relevant rule through the medium of 
                                                          
15 Sayers [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [10], referring to the White Book 1999 at para 59/4/17. The four factors are 
derived from C.M. Van Stillevoldt BV v EL Carriers Inc [1983] 1 WLR 207, and are taken from Sime, A Practical 
Approach to Civil Procedure, 1st ed (Blackstone Press Ltd 1994, p 493). This approach was rejected because it 
failed to reflect the new, more rigorous, approach required by the CPR. 
16 Sayers [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [13]. This had been recommended by the authors of the Report on the 
Review of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (September 1997) (usually known as the Bowman Report), at p 
91. This was not adopted when CPR Part 52 on appeals was promulgated. 
17 Sayers [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [17], [18]. The equivalent position at the time of writing is PD 52C, para 4(2). 
18 Sayers [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [19]. 
19 Sayers [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [18]. 
20 Sayers [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [18], [23]. 
21 In Customs and Excise Commissioners v Eastwood Care Homes (Ilkeston) Ltd, The Times, 7 March 2000. 
22 Annodeus Entertainment Ltd v Gibson, unreported, 2 February 2000, quoted in Audergon v La Baguette Ltd 
[2002] EWCA Civ 10, [2003] CPLR 192 at [51]. 
23 In Audergon v La Baguette Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 10, [2003] CPLR 192 at [107]. Pill and Tuckey LJJ agreed. 
judicial decision. That would seem to me to be just the kind of undesirable consequence which the 
CPR were designed to avoid.' 
 
This was quoted with approval by Brooke LJ, commenting that '... judge-made check-lists of this kind 
are to be avoided wherever possible.' It was because the original CPR, r 3.9 laid down a prescribed 
check-list in the Rules themselves that '... it would be far better for courts to follow the check-list 
contained in CPR r 3.9 ...'.24 A proper reading of Sayers v Clarke Walker is therefore not that it lays 
down a general implied sanctions doctrine, but that it seeks to promote consistency by making use 
of the r 3.9 check-list where appropriate in preference to judges devising their own check-lists. This 
is exactly the way commentators interpreted the decision at the time. For example, the 2003 edition 
of Blackstone's Civil Practice in dealing with applications to extend the time for appealing said25: 
 
'The principles laid down in pre-CPR cases on extending time for appealing are no longer good law 
(Sayers v Clarke Walker [2002] EWCA Civ 645, [2002] 1 WLR 3095). In simple cases, it will be enough 
for the court to consider the matters set out in PD 52, para. 5.2, namely the reason for the delay and 
the steps taken prior to the application to extend time being made. In more complex cases, the court 
should apply the factors laid down in CPR, r. 3.9, and should avoid judge-made checklists of matters 
to consider (Sayers v Clarke-Walker). Each application must be viewed by reference to the criterion 
of justice, and it is important to bear in mind that time limits are there to be observed, and that 
justice may be seriously defeated if there is any laxity in this regard.' 
 
Even in the 2014 edition of the White Book, in considering the general power to extend time in CPR, 
r 3.1(2)(a), the notes refer to Sayers v Clarke Walker and maintain the distinction between most 
cases, where applications are governed by the overriding objective, and more complex cases where 
'... the court should have regard to the language of r. 3.9 ...'26, with a reference to the fact that the 
long check-list in the original r 3.9 has been replaced following the Jackson reforms by a shorter rule 
with only two specific factors to be taken into account. Elsewhere in the White Book the view is 
stated that r 3.9 only comes into play where a sanction is imposed as a result of a failure to comply 
with a rule etc27, apparently denying the existence of the implied sanctions doctrine. 
 
Professor Zuckerman28 takes a different approach. Para [21] of Sayers v Clarke Walker is quoted 
almost in full in support of the proposition that r 3.9 has been considered in a range of situations 
even where the result was not a sanction29.  Zuckerman takes the view that the requirements 
imposed by the CPR and court directions are not duties or obligations in the sense these terms are 
used in other branches of the law, because litigants remain free to choose whether or not to 
comply30. On this theory, it follows that the consequences of default are not punitive in nature, but 
are merely regulatory31, and so the consequences of non-compliance are not properly termed 
'sanctions' at all32. The argument continues that r 3.9 should be applied to all forms of procedural 
default, with the advantage that an integrated approach to non-compliance may be developed by 
                                                          
24 Sayers [2002] EWCA Civ 645 at [18], [23] and [21]. 
25 Blackstone's Civil Practice 2003 (2003) Oxford at para 71.15. 
26 White Book 2014, para 3.1.2. 
27 White Book 2014, para 3.9.1 of the main volume, and supported by comments in the Fourth Cumulative 
Supplement at paras 3.9.5.1 and 3.9.5.14. This latter para continues in its fourth and fifth sub-paras to 
acknowledge the existence of various of the authorities referred to below, apparently without accepting their 
validity. 
28 Zuckerman on Civil Procedure, 3rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) 
29 Zuckerman on Civil Procedure at paras 11.133 and 11.134. 
30 Zuckerman on Civil Procedure at para 11.13. 
31 Zuckerman on Civil Procedure at paras 11.14; 11.15 and 11.136. 
32 Zuckerman on Civil Procedure at para 11.15. 
the courts33. The underlying premise of this argument has not been adopted by the Civil Procedure 
Rule Committee, and the idea that there are 'sanctions' which may be prescribed by the Rules 
themselves or by the court is deeply embedded in the Civil Procedure Rules34. What is of interest for 
present purposes is that Professor Zuckerman's treatment of Sayers v Clarke Walker is not as the 
foundation for an implied sanctions doctrine, but as part of an argument that the consequences of 
procedural default are not sanctions at all35. 
 
If things had stopped here there would no controversy. Obviously applications for extending time to 
appeal have to be governed by settled principles. Given that the respondent has already secured an 
adjudication by the court, the interests in the finality of litigation36 dictate that those principles have 
to be restrictive in this context. Avoiding a proliferation of different tests is a key objective of civil 
process37, so adopting the ready-made check-list by analogy from the original r 3.9 was a very 
sensible approach. 
 
In-time Applications 
Lord Dyson, at that time sitting as a Lord Justice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal, dealt with an early 
implied sanctions case38 raising the question whether an application for an extension of time which 
is made before the relevant deadline has expired amounts to an application for relief from sanctions.  
A claim form in a personal injuries claim was issued on 1 March 2001. The particulars of claim were 
not prepared because the claimant's solicitor was awaiting a medical report, which had to be served 
with the particulars39. Particulars of claim, if not served with the claim form, must be served within 
14 days of service of the claim form, and in any event before the expiry of the period of validity of 
the claim form40. An application to extend the period for serving the particulars of claim was issued 
on 13 June 2001; the claim form was served on about 1 July 2001, the final day of its validity, which 
was also the final date for serving the particulars of claim. The fact the application to extend time 
was not heard until 3 October 2001 was irrelevant: the application had been made before expiry of 
the deadline41. 
 
Dyson LJ was faced with the issue whether the claimant's application for an extension of time to 
serve the particulars claim, which was made under the general power to extend time set out in CPR, 
r 3.1(2)(a), is governed by the criteria in r 3.9. Dyson LJ quoted at length from the judgment of 
Brooke LJ in Sayers v Clarke Walker, then commented42: 
 
                                                          
33 Zuckerman on Civil Procedure at para 11.137. 
34 Most obviously in CPR rr 3.7 to 3.9, but also in numerous other places, see the table of sanctions set out in 
Sime, Sanctions after Mitchell [2014] CJQ 133 at 151 to 152. 
35 Professor Zuckerman also referred to Sayers v Clarke Walker in his article The revised CPR 3.9: a coded 
message demanding articulation [2013] CJQ 123 at 132-133, in the context of satellite litigation giving rise to a 
whole jurisprudence about the different factors in the original r 3.9, a process not helped by making use of the 
r 3.9 checklist in many other situations, including the Sayers v Clarke Walker situation of extending the time for 
appealing. Again, there is no reference to the implied sanctions doctrine. 
36 This has long been recognised as an important consideration on applications to extend the time for 
appealing, see Norwich and Peterborough Building Society v Steed [1991] 1 WLR 449, per Lord Donaldson of 
Lymington MR. 
37 The Civil Procedure Rule Committee is under a duty to try to make rules that are simple and simply 
expressed: Civil Procedure Act 1997, s 2(7), something that has apparently been forgotten.  
38 Robert v Momentum Services Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 299, [2003] 1 WLR 1577. 
39 As required by PD 16, para 4.3. 
40 CPR, r 7.4. 
41 CPR r 23.5. 
42 Robert [2003] EWCA Civ 299 at [33]. 
'It is clear that Brooke LJ treated Sayer's case as a relief from sanctions case, or at least closely 
analogous to such a case. That is because the time for appealing had already expired when the 
application for an extension of time was made. I see no reason to import the rule 3.9(1) checklists by 
implication into rule 3.1(2)(a) where an application for an extension of time is made before the 
expiry of the relevant time limit. There is a difference in principle between on the one hand seeking 
relief from a sanction imposed for failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order, 
where such failure has already occurred, and on the other hand seeking an extension of time for 
doing something required by a rule, practice direction or court order before the time for doing so 
has arrived. The latter cannot sensibly be regarded as, or even closely analogous to, a relief from 
sanctions case. If the draftsman of the rule had intended that the checklist set out in rule 3.9(1) 
should be applied when the court is exercising its discretion under CPR 3.1(2)(a) in such a case, then 
he could and, in my judgment, would have said so.' 
 
Accordingly, on an in-time application the judge should simply have regard to the overriding 
objective of dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost, including any relevant 
considerations from CPR, r 1.1(2). 
 
Robert v Momentum Services Ltd was severely criticised by Professor Zuckerman43 because it did not 
fit into his argument that the consequences of failing to comply with process requirements is 
regulatory rather than punitive. However, as mentioned above, the underlying theory is inconsistent 
with the scheme of the CPR, and Robert v Momentum Services Ltd shows the Court of Appeal 
drawing a sharp distinction between cases where applications are made before as opposed to those 
made after the expiry of the relevant deadline. This is because after the deadline the sanction takes 
effect44, and, as the word itself indicates, sanctions are punitive. That there is a distinction between 
in-time and after the event applications for extensions of time was flagged up by Lord Dyson MR in 
Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd45. When the point arose directly in Hallam Estates Ltd v 
Baker46 the Court of Appeal affirmed the distinction. Giving the main judgment, Jackson LJ said that 
an in-time application for an extension of time simply is not an application for relief from 
sanctions47. 
 
There is a marked contrast between two schools of thought among the academic writers on the 
question of sanctions, which can be explained as the contrast between those who regard sanctions 
as having a punitive effect48 and those who regard them as regulatory49. Those in the latter group 
tend to want to extend the reach of r 3.9 to all applications where the applicant is seeking a 
discretionary order. Whatever the difference between the academics, the Court of Appeal has drawn 
a clear distinction between a litigant who fails to comply with a deadline, who can expect adverse 
(punitive) consequences to follow, and a litigant who respects the relevant deadline and seeks to co-
operate with the court by seeking an extension before falling into default. 
 
                                                          
43 Zuckerman on Civil Procedure at paras 11.135 to 11.137. 
44 CPR, r 3.8(1). 
45 Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537, [2014] 1 WLR 795 at [41]. 
46 Hallam Estates Ltd v Baker [2014] EWCA Civ 661, CP Rep 38.  
47 Hallam Estates Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 661 at [26]. This position was affirmed in the leading implied sanctions 
doctrine case, R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, at [29]. 
48 Including the author, and also probably Professor Zander (A Step too Far (2014) NLJ 16 May 2014) and 
Steven Akerman (There can be only (CPR) 1: the reasonableness of Mitchell (and litigation generally) is 
confirmed [2014] JPIL 191). 
49 In addition to Professor Zuckerman, probably Andrew Higgins (CPR 3.9: the Mitchell guidance, the Denton 
revision, and why coded messages don't make for good case management [2014] CLQ 379) and Jack Williams 
('Well, that's a relief (from sanctions)!" - Time to pause and take stock of CPR r. 3.9 developments within a 
general theory of case management [2014] CJQ 394). 
Subsequent Development 
On a piecemeal basis, no doubt depending on the relative success of researches of counsel in 
different cases, Sayers v Clarke Walker started to be applied in a range of applications. By far the 
most important was in setting aside default judgments. In Hussain v Birmingham City Council50 an 
application to set aside judgment in default was granted on appeal apparently with the respondents 
conceding this result51. Despite this unpromising provenance, this case has been treated as Court of 
Appeal authority for the implied sanctions doctrine52. This was a personal injuries claim in which a 6-
year old child fell through a window in a school. There was a dispute over who was responsible for 
the school premises. One of the defendants issued a third party claim against 'the Governors' of the 
school, and the default judgment was entered in this third party claim. There was some delay in 
applying to set aside the default judgment, but the contemporaneous documentation showed that 
the third party claim had probably been made against the wrong party, and in any event the facts of 
the accident showed that the right party was likely to have a good defence53. 
 
Applications to set aside regularly entered default judgments are governed by CPR, r 13.3. Criteria to 
be applied on these applications are laid down in the rule itself: whether the defendant has a real 
prospect of success, or whether there is some other good reason to set aside the judgment; and 
among the factors to be considered is whether the application has been made promptly. The 
wording of r 13.3(2), which says: 'In considering whether to set aside ... the matters to which the 
court must have regard include ...', makes it clear that the specific requirements in r 13.3 are not the 
only things to be considered.  The traditional way of interpreting r 13.3(2) is to regard it as requiring 
the court to consider all the circumstances of the case in accordance with the overriding objective. 
 
Hussain v Birmingham City Council went further than this, with Chadwick LJ saying: 'Second there is, 
by analogy, the guidance given in CPR 3.9(1) (relief from sanctions) and in CPR 39.3(5) (setting aside 
judgment where a party has failed to attend at trial).'54 The idea that r 39.3(5) might assist was not 
developed, but the checklist in r 3.9(1) and how it applied to the facts of the case was considered in 
some detail55. Weighing up those factors, Chadwick LJ concluded: 'Nothing in any of those factors 
would lead the Court to relieve the Governors of the sanction which the entry of judgment in default 
imposes.'56 From this the implied sanctions doctrine was born. 
 
In the event the implied sanctions doctrine played no part in the actual decision in Hussain v 
Birmingham City Council. Rule 3.9 pointed firmly against setting aside. Indeed, there was nothing in 
the r 3.9 factors pointing in the other direction. Instead, the default judgment was set aside primarily 
because it could not stand on the merits, which is the traditional approach to setting aside under r 
13.3. The decision is unreasoned on the implied sanction point; fails to refer to any of the 
authorities; was decided on the basis of concessions by the other parties; and did not apply r 3.9 in 
the sense of making any difference to the decision (and in fact the decision is contrary to how r 3.9 
was analysed by the court). There is very little discussion on how the r 3.9 factors inter-relate with 
those laid down by r 13.3, except that r 13.3 seems to have taken precedence over the r 3.9 
factors57. This is about as unsatisfactory an authority for a new doctrine as can be imagined. 
 
                                                          
50 Hussain v Birmingham City Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1570, LTL25/11/2005. 
51 Hussain [2005] EWCA Civ 1570 at [38]. 
52 Samara v MBI & Partners UK Ltd [2014] EWHC 563 (QB) and Mid-East Sales Ltd v United Engineering & 
Trading Co (Pvt) Ltd [2014] EWHC 1457 (Comm). 
53 Hussain [2005] EWCA Civ 1570 at [37]. 
54 Hussain [2005] EWCA Civ 1570 at [30]. 
55 Hussain [2005] EWCA Civ 1570 at [32] to [35]. 
56 Hussain [2005] EWCA Civ 1570 at [35]. 
57 Hussain [2005] EWCA Civ 1570 at [35] to [40]. 
The doctrine was then firmed up in a number of cases involving applications to appeal out of time. In 
YD (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department58 Brooke LJ said that as it was a case 
where the application for permission to appeal was made out of time it was necessary to consider 
the factors set out in r 3.9. The same approach was adopted in Jackson v Marina Homes Ltd59, Bank 
of Scotland v Periera60 and Yeates v Aviva Insurance UK Ltd 61. The way it was put by Longmore LJ in 
Yeates v Aviva Insurance UK Ltd 62 was that Sayers v Clarke Walker decided that on an application for 
an extension of the time for appealing '... the court must not only take into account the overriding 
objective in CPR 1.1 of enabling the court to deal with cases justly but also the checklist of 
considerations listed in CPR 3.9(1) as circumstances to be considered on an application for relief 
from sanctions.' Like Sayers v Clarke Walker63, the Court of Appeal in Yeates v Aviva Insurance UK 
Ltd64 was heavily influenced by the policy behind the Bowman Report and the importance of finality 
in the appeal context where the time for appealing has expired without an application for 
permission to appeal. As mentioned above, this is a powerful reason for taking a restrictive 
approach, and justifies applying r 3.9 by analogy on applications extending time for appeals. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago Cases 
Two cases on the implied sanctions doctrine from the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago reached the Privy Council in 2011. Lord Dyson delivered the judgment of the Board in 
both cases. Under the Trinidad and Tobago version of the CPR65, r 13.366 on setting aside regular 
judgments is in broadly similar terms to the English r 13.3; and r 26.6(2)67 is broadly similar to the 
English r 3.8(1).  Trinidad and Tobago CPR, r 26.7 deals with relief from sanctions, adopting some of 
the English concepts in the original r 3.9. It provides: 
 
'Relief from sanctions 
(1) An application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, court 
order or direction must be made promptly. 
(2) An application for relief must be supported by evidence. 
(3) The court may grant relief only if it is satisfied that― 
(a) the failure to comply was not intentional; 
(b) there is a good explanation for the breach; and 
(c) the party in default has generally complied with all other relevant rules, practice directions, 
orders and directions. 
(4) In considering whether to grant relief, the court must have regard to― 
                                                          
58 YD (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 52, [2006] 1 WLR 1646 
at [35]. 
59 Jackson v Marina Homes Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1404 at [20]. 
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(a) the interests of the administration of justice; 
(b) whether the failure to comply was due to the party or his attorney; 
(c) whether the failure to comply has been or can be remedied within a reasonable time; and 
(d) whether the trial date or any likely trial date can still be met if relief is granted. 
(5) The court may not order the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs in relation to any application 
for relief unless exceptional circumstances are shown.' 
 
It will be seen that this adopts similar wording to the original English r 3.9, and all the concepts in the 
English r 3.9(1)(a) to (g) and r 3.9(2), but includes at Trinidad and Tobago r 26.7(4)(c) a consideration 
of whether the default has been or can be remedied within a reasonable time, which was not in the 
English rule, and that the Trinidad and Tobago rule does not include the English r 3.9(1)(h) and (i) 
(the effect which failure to comply had on each party, and the effect of granting relief on each 
party). It also prioritises the factors, differentiating between those that are treated as essential in r 
26.7(3), and those which are to be taken into account in para (4). 
 
In Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Universal Projects Ltd 68 the claimant sought payment of 
$31 million for work done on state highways. The claim form was served, but was placed by 
inexperienced staff acting for the relevant Ministry in a vacant office, where it was not discovered 
until after the claimant had applied for permission to enter judgment in default. By a series of 
fortunate chances the legal representative for the government was in court on the day the default 
judgment application was to be heard, and on that occasion an unless order was made giving the 
government a further 21 days to serve a defence, expiring on 13 March 2009, and in default leave 
was granted to the claimant to enter judgment against the defendant. A defence was not served 
within the time allowed by the unless order, and judgment was entered 3 days later. 
 
On the government's application to set aside that judgment it was argued that the application was 
to set aside a default judgment under Trinidad and Tobago r 13.3. This was rejected by the Board. As 
Lord Dyson said, the unless order imposed a term that in default the claimant had permission to 
enter judgment. That term was a 'sanction' within the meaning of Trinidad and Tobago r 26.7. As 
Lord Dyson explained: 
 
'The word "sanction" is an ordinary word. It has no special or technical meaning in rule 26.7. 
Dictionary definitions of "sanction" include "the specific penalty enacted in order to enforce 
obedience to a law". That is precisely what the term attached to the grant of an extension of time 
was. It was a penalty69 that would be imposed if the defence was not served by 13 March. In the 
language of rule 26.6(1)70, it was the consequence of the failure to comply with the court order. ... 
The sanction was the judgment entered pursuant to the permission.' 
 
Relief from sanctions had been refused by the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago, and the Privy Council found no grounds for interfering with that decision. 
 
Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews71 was a claim for damages for assault and 
battery against the State arising out of an alleged assault by a prison officer. The last day for filing 
the defence was 11 November 2009. Problems were encountered in interviewing the relevant staff 
for the purpose of drafting the defence. On 11 December the claimant applied for permission to 
enter judgment in default, and on 14 January 2010 the defendant applied for an extension of time 
for filing the defence. Both applications were heard together. 
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The Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago allowed an appeal by the claimant and 
gave permission to enter judgment in default of defence, applying the reasoning in two of its 
previous decisions. Trinican Oil Ltd v Schnake72 was an application to extend time for filing an appeal. 
P Jamadar JA said that once the deadline passed with no prior application for an extension of time 
there was an implied sanction that no appeal could be pursued. The other previous decision was 
Khanhai v Cyrus73, where it was held that where a defendant failed to file a defence by the stipulated 
deadline there was a sanction to the effect that, without the permission of the court, no defence 
could be served. It followed that a defendant seeking to file a defence after the deadline had to 
make an application for relief from sanctions under the Trinidad and Tobago r 26.7. 
 
There was a third decision of the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago on the 
same subject, Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Regis74, which affirmed the implied 
sanctions doctrine, where the court75 said: 
 
'The consequences of these decisions and the approach mandated by the Court of Appeal has 
resulted in an observable shift away from a cancerous laissez-faire approach to civil litigation to a 
more responsible and diligent one. However, the discipline that is now demanded has also resulted 
in some disquiet among some members of the legal profession and even among a few judges. ...  The 
aforesaid decisions of the Court of Appeal on Part 26.7 reflect the exercise of the indigenous court’s 
interpretative function as it develops a local jurisprudence relevant to existing needs and 
circumstances. While it is acknowledged that other jurisdictions and other cultures may adopt 
different approaches to similar problems, it is hoped that regard will be paid to the experiences and 
insights of local judges to know what best suits the needs of local society as they seek, in the 
exercise of their independent sovereignty and constitutional mandate, to interpret and apply the 
laws of Trinidad and Tobago in ways that are purposeful for their people.' 
 
Chief Justice Sharma noted in the foreword to the Trinidad and Tobago CPR 1998 that: 
 
'It marks an important milestone in the development of our jurisprudential history. It seeks to instil 
discipline and promote responsible behaviour on the part of all participants in the litigation process. 
Discipline in any system is the hallmark of efficiency and productivity.' 
 
The Chief Justice's comments are consistent with the policy behind the English Civil Justice Reforms 
of 2013. As Jackson LJ explained in Fred Perry (Holdings) Ltd v Brands Plaza Trading Ltd 76, the 2013 
version of CPR, r 3.9 was implemented to address '... concern that relief against sanctions is being 
granted too readily at the present time. Such a culture of delay and non-compliance is injurious to 
the civil justice system and to litigants generally.' The need for discipline and effective management 
of the English civil justice system to control toleration of procedural default has been forcefully 
argued by Professor Zuckerman77. Speaking extra judicially, Lord Dyson MR said of the 
implementation of the Jackson Reforms that 'By emphasising the need to take account of the new 
explicit elements of the overriding objective, r 3.9 is intended to eliminate lax application and any 
culture of toleration. ... Parties can no longer expect indulgence if they fail to comply with their 
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procedural obligations. Those obligations not only serve the purpose of ensuring that they conduct 
the litigation proportionately in order to ensure their own costs are kept within proportionate 
bounds. But more importantly they serve the wider public interest of ensuring that other litigants 
can obtain justice efficiently and proportionately, and that the court enables them to do so.'78 
 
While everyone agrees that it is important that litigation is conducted efficiently, expeditiously and 
at no more than proportionate cost, there are different theories on how to achieve this. The way the 
implied sanctions doctrine developed in Trinidad and Tobago resulted in the conclusion being drawn 
that once a deadline passed, a litigant was no longer allowed to take the relevant step, unless relief 
from sanctions was granted79. As explained by Lord Dyson80, the argument had 6 elements: 
 
(a) in any case where a party needs or wishes to take procedural steps; 
(b) and a mandatory time limit is prescribed by the rules for the taking of this step; 
(c) if the time limit has expired without the party making an application for an extension of time for 
the taking of the step; 
(d) then, unless a rule expressly otherwise states, the party is disabled from taking the relevant step; 
(e) being placed under that disability is an adverse consequence for that party which flows from that 
failure to observe the rule which prescribes the time limit; and 
(f) the adverse consequence is a sanction within the meaning of Trinidad and Tobago rule 26.7 (the 
equivalent of the English r 3.9). 
 
In short, Trinidad and Tobago CPR rr 26.6 and 26.7 were said to be designed to ensure compliance 
with all the time limits provided by the rules of court, practice directions and court orders81. This is 
effectively the argument raised by Professor Zuckerman82. It was rejected by Lord Dyson for three 
reasons. 
 
First, the way that entering default judgment works is that once the time limited for filing a defence 
has expired the claimant is entitled to enter (or apply for permission to enter, depending on the 
circumstances) judgment in default. But, until the claimant does so, the defendant remains entitled 
to file a defence without permission. As Lord Dyson said, 'If the claimant does nothing or waives late 
service, the defence stands and no question of sanction arises.'83 
 
Secondly, Trinidad and Tobago CPR rr 26.6 and 26.784 have to be read together. Rule 26.7 provides 
for applications for relief from any sanction imposed85 for a failure to comply inter alia with any rule. 
When read together with r 26.6(2), which says that where a party has failed inter alia to comply with 
any rule any sanction for non-compliance imposed by the rule has effect unless the party in default 
applies for and obtains relief from the sanction, the Board concluded that this is aiming at rules, 
practice directions and orders which themselves impose or specify the consequences of a failure to 
comply. Examples mentioned by Lord Dyson were failing to serve witness statements86, failure to 
                                                          
78 Lord Dyson The Application of the Amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules [2014] CLQ 124 at 130, 131. This 
was originally delivered as the 18th Implementation Lecture relating to the Jackson Reforms (Judicial College, 
22 March 2013). 
79 Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews [2011] UKPC 38 at [13]. 
80 Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews [2011] UKPC 38 at [12]. 
81 Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews [2011] UKPC 38 at [13]. 
82 See FN 33. 
83 Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews [2011] UKPC 38 at [14]. 
84 The equivalent provisions in England and Wales are CPR rr 3.8 and 3.9. 
85 Emphasis on this word is that of Lord Dyson, Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews [2011] 
UKPC 38 at [15]. 
86 Trinidad and Tobago CPR r 29.13(1); England and Wales CPR r 32.10. 
disclose documents relied upon87, and failing to comply with directions to disclose experts' reports88. 
In each of these cases both the Trinidad and Tobago and the England and Wales versions of the CPR 
have express sanctions. 
 
Where a rule says nothing about the consequences of breach, such as the rules on serving a defence, 
Lord Dyson commented that89: 'It is straining language to say that a sanction is imposed by the rules 
in such circumstances. At most, it can be said that, if the defendant fails to file a defence within the 
prescribed period and does not apply for an extension of time, he is at risk of a request by the 
claimant that judgment in default should be entered in his favour. That is not a sanction imposed by 
the rules. Sanctions imposed by the rules are consequences which the rules themselves explicitly 
specify and impose.' 
 
Thirdly, the implied sanctions doctrine would have consequences that could not have been intended 
by the draftsman of the CPR. It would mean that on an application to set aside a default judgment 
the defendant would have to satisfy two tests: the one set out in CPR r 13.3, and also the criteria for 
relief from sanctions90. As Lord Dyson pointed out91, the criteria for these are quite different from 
each other, and '... [i]t cannot have been intended that a defendant who wishes to set aside a 
default judgment must satisfy the requirements of both rules.' 
 
While commending the efforts of the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago to end 
the culture of laissez faire, this was a case where the language of the rules admitted of only one 
interpretation, which had to be given effect. An application to set aside a default judgment or to 
extend the time for filing a defence is not an application for relief from sanctions. It follows that the 
Privy Council also ruled against the idea that CPR rr 3.8 and 3.9 govern all applications under the 
CPR. 
 
Resurgence of the Implied Sanctions Doctrine 
The obvious weakness in the Trinidad and Tobago cases is that decisions of the Privy Council are not 
binding in England and Wales. Confronted with the series of Court of Appeal decisions applying CPR r 
3.9 by analogy on applications to extend time to appeal92, the courts in England and Wales have on a 
number of occasions felt constrained to apply the implied sanctions doctrine despite the decision in 
Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews. 
 
In Altomart Ltd v Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd93 the Court of Appeal extended the use of CPR r 3.9 by 
analogy to an application for an extension of time to file a respondent's notice. While this is an 
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extension on the previous authorities, it is wholly consistent with the policy behind the authorities 
on failing to comply with the time limit for filing an appellant's notice. Moore-Bick LJ agreed with the 
second reason given by Lord Dyson in Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews that the 
language of the English CPR rr 3.8 and 3.9 is absolutely clear that r 3.9 only applies to cases where 
the sanction is imposed by the self-same rule, practice direction or court order that has been 
breached94. However, referring to a number of cases95, Moore-Bick LJ concluded that it is now 
established that an application for permission to appeal out of time is analogous to an application 
under r 3.9, and therefore has to be decided in accordance with the same principles96. A respondent 
applying for an extension of time for filing a respondent's notice is subject to a similar implied 
sanction in being prevented from pursuing the merits of the case it wishes to pursue on the appeal if 
the extension is not granted, so the same principle applies to these applications97. This was followed 
by the Court of Appeal in R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department98 where a direct 
challenge to the implied sanctions doctrine, relying on Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v 
Matthews, was made without success. 
 
On the face of it this seems uncontroversial. However, the check-list of 9 factors in the original r 3.9 
was replaced with effect from 1 April 2013 with the current r 3.9 which stipulates that on an 
application for relief from sanctions the court must consider all the circumstances of the case so as 
to enable it to deal justly with the application, and includes only two factors which must be given 
particular consideration. As Professor Zuckerman has pointed out, the current r 3.9 says little that is 
not already in the overriding objective in r 1.1, or which any court has always done, namely to 
enforce its own orders99. Although the r 3.9 check-list has now gone, cases adopting the implied 
sanctions doctrine decided in the period 2013-14 have applied the guidelines in Mitchell v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd100, and those decided after 4 July 2014 apply Denton v TH White Ltd101. 
 
What the post-Jackson Reforms implied sanctions doctrine cases do is to metamorphose the Sayers 
v Clarke Walker approach from its origins in making use of a check-list prescribed by the CPR into 
one where it is a set of judge-made guidelines that are applied by analogy. This may be thought to 
be exactly the mischief that Brooke LJ was attempting to avoid in Sayers v Clarke Walker102. A slightly 
more sophisticated interpretation of Sayers v Clarke Walker was given by Moore-Bick LJ in R (Hysaj) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department103. Rather than merely applying the r 3.9 check-list by 
analogy, what Sayers v Clarke Walker did was to require judges on applications to extend the time 
for appealing to consider the check-list of factors in r 3.9 as it then stood in order to promote 
consistency of approach. As it is consistency of approach that is the goal, it is perfectly legitimate for 
that approach to change from time-to-time as and when r 3.9 is amended, and as and when the 
guidance on r 3.9 changes. 
 
Mid-East Sales Ltd v United Engineering and Trading Company (PVT)104 is a rather inconclusive 
authority. It discusses Sayers v Clarke Walker and Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v 
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Matthews in the context of an application to set aside an order for service outside the jurisdiction, 
but ultimately the judge held that there was an express sanction in the form of a default judgment. 
 
In two first instance cases105 the implied sanctions doctrine has been applied in applications to 
extend time for filing particulars of claim. Raayan Al Iraq Co Ltd v Trans Victory Marine Inc was one 
of the cases discussed by Lord Dyson MR in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd 106. Commenting 
on this in R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department107, Moore-Bick LJ pointed out that 
there is no suggestion in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd that the judge had been wrong to 
regard the application as one for relief from a sanction, or at any rate sufficiently analogous to such 
an application to be determined applying the same principles. If this is correct, it opens up a wide 
range of problems. First, it re-opens the controversy over whether sanctions are punitive or 
regulatory. Secondly, it opens the door to the proposition that all process failures should be decided 
applying the r 3.9 guidance. Thirdly, if it is the case that some, but not all, process failures are 
sufficiently serious to merit the application of the r 3.9 guidance by analogy, it will be open season to 
satellite litigation covering the whole of civil procedure in considering whether different applications 
are sufficiently serious or are of the right kind to justify applying r 3.9 by analogy108. If the conclusion 
is that it depends on the seriousness of the breach in the circumstances of the individual case, it will 
add a layer of additional controversy to every application involving a discretionary indulgence from 
the court, which will add expense and delay to the whole civil justice system. 
 
With the greatest respect to Lord Dyson MR, it is suggested that his Lordship's comments on Raayan 
Al Iraq Co Ltd v Trans Victory Marine Inc in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd are a rare 
instance when Homer nodded. Lord Dyson MR was concentrating in Mitchell v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd on the guidance desperately needed by the profession on the approach to 
applications for relief from sanctions. It is entirely understandable that his Lordship was not directing 
his mind to whether individual first instance cases raised the (at that time) nascent implied sanctions 
doctrine. That this is almost certainly the case is supported by Lord Dyson MR's closing remarks on 
the general principles governing applications for relief from sanctions in Denton v TH White Ltd109: 
 
'Judges should also have in mind, when making directions, where the Rules provide for automatic 
sanctions in the case of default. Likewise, the parties should be aware of these consequences when 
they are agreeing directions. "Unless" orders should be reserved for situations in which they are 
truly required: there are usually so as to enable the litigation to proceed efficiently and at 
proportionate cost.' 
 
These comments are part of Lord Dyson MR's description of the compact between the courts and 
litigants. Courts will lay down reasonable directions, and parties will comply with those directions. In 
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doing so, Lord Dyson MR identifies the two categories where there are express sanctions as those 
where special care is needed when directions are made. If Lord Dyson MR thought the implied 
sanctions doctrine has a general application, this guidance would not have been necessary (and in 
fact would be entirely misleading). 
 
Raayan Al Iraq Co Ltd v Trans Victory Marine Inc is in any event contrary to previous Court of Appeal 
authority. Robert v Momentum Services Ltd, which was a case on extending time for service of the 
particulars of claim, has already been discussed110. Totty v Snowden decided that applications to 
extend the time for service of particulars of claim are not governed by the principles in r 7.6, but are 
ordinary applications to extend time governed by r 3.1(2)(a) and the overriding objective111. The 
better view is that the decisions that the implied sanctions doctrine applies to applications to extend 
time for service of the particulars of claim are wrong. 
 
Conclusion 
Left unbridled, the implied sanctions doctrine has the potential to create havoc in the civil justice 
system. It has the potential to cause uncertainty over the status of court orders across the whole of 
civil litigation. If allowed to take root, it will add to the cost and complexity of applications to extend 
time, possibly in all such applications. Apart from the additional raft of principles generated by the 
doctrine itself, if it is applied, it also has the effect, as recognised by Lord Dyson MR in Attorney-
General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews112, on occasion to require consideration of two sets of 
principles, such as those relating to setting aside default judgments in r 13.3 and those relating to 
relief from sanctions in r 3.9, in what would otherwise be reasonably straightforward applications. 
None of this is at all attractive, and is completely contrary to the overriding objective of dealing with 
cases justly and at proportionate cost. 
 
Despite the brave attempt by Lord Dyson to kill off the implied sanctions doctrine, it has refused to 
succumb. In the leading case on the implied sanctions doctrine113, Moore-Bick LJ agreed with much 
of what was said by Lord Dyson in Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews, and even said 
that if the area had been free from authority he would have been attracted by the submission that 
Sayers v Clarke Walker had been misunderstood and misapplied114. As recognised by Moore-Bick LJ 
in R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department the doctrine has become established in 
relation to extending time in appeals. While his Lordship refers to cases on extending time for 
serving particulars of claim and one or two other areas in his judgment in that case, what his 
Lordship actually said was: 
 
'I think the approach to be taken to applications of the kind now under consideration is now too 
well-established to be overturned.' 
 
These were applications to extend time in appeals. Therefore, the ratio of R (Hysaj) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department is limited to extensions of time in appeals, and is to the effect that 
on such applications the court must apply, by analogy, the guidance given by the Court of Appeal for 
dealing with applications for relief from sanctions under r 3.9. This has been extended to 
applications to extend time for filing respondents' notices by Altomart Ltd v Salford Estates (No 2) 
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Ltd115. It is submitted that this should be the extent of the implied sanctions doctrine. The 
miscellaneous cases in support of the doctrine in other contexts are either wrongly decided or 
otherwise unsatisfactory and contrary to principle. 
 
There may be legitimate reasons for demanding more onerous grounds in certain types of 
applications than currently provided by CPR rr 1.1 and 3.1(2)(a). If this is so, the right approach is for 
the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to make the necessary amendments to the relevant provisions 
of the CPR. There is nothing to prevent the Committee making specific reference to the criteria set 
out in r 3.9, or any other criteria, for different types of application.  It has already done so, for 
example, in relation to extending the period of validity of a claim form in r 7.6, and for setting aside 
default judgments in r 13.3. It would be best if suitable amendments were now to be made to CPR rr 
52.4 and 52.5 to codify the position on extending time in appeals by making express provision 
applying the guidance on r 3.9 to these applications. The CPR have to be accessible to all court users, 
and it is fundamentally wrong that special rules should only be accessible to those in the know. It 
would be sensible, at the same time, to include a suitable provision in PD 3A to the effect that the 
implied sanctions doctrine no longer has any effect. 
 
It has been pointed out more than once that if the draftsman intended to impose more onerous 
requirements for some types of application, that could easily have been done, and where this is not 
so, it is not for the courts to impose such requirements116. As Lord Dyson said in Attorney-General of 
Trinidad & Tobago v Matthews117, if the Rule Committee wishes to impose the r 3.9 conditions as 
additional requirements in any particular area, then this should be done expressly by an appropriate 
amendment to the rule. 
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